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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * * * *

* ** *

111i,,\;)TERU
IPt!ENT CO., a
,,,gLi Corporation aud WILLIAM
',,111:111 S, Intervenor,

Plaintiffs - Respondents,
vs.

CASE NO. 19041

JAt!ES MAUSS and ENGLEllARDE
dba JIM'S SURPLUS and
STOK.ACE,
Defendants - Appellants.

* * * * * * * * * * * * *
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
William Cochis

STATEMENT OF CASE
On January 31, 1983, a Sheriff's Sale was to be conducted
in order to sell, at a public sale, the following described
parcel of real property:
Lot 3 of Block 135, Plat "A", Tooele City
Survey, Tooele County.
The Appellant, prior to the scheduled Sheriff's Sale,
sought to stop the sale by submitting a Motion to Enjoin
Sheriff's Sale. This Motion was heard on February 15, 1983.

The

Appellant contended, al the hearing, thal a contract e}{isted
between the parties which limited the Respondent to collect only
"

'•_',J.0(J

per month payment on the Judgment of $11,540.33, which
-1-

was awarded to the Respondent un t1av L'.

1•-l/'i.

'l'l1t

l\t' ,,M.l)J(l•·'.1'

contended. at the h<';irirt)'

I

The Respondent did df'.rL'<' that

sJrtL'l'

J,111u<11-v

Ii"

<>J

<,Ii•'

Ii":

receiving $20.00 per montli frcJm tl1v 11ppc·l l.n1t
out he did not enter intc• d cuntLtct 1<'llt1 u1"

the judgment,

Appellant to b2 foreve1- bound to such
The Court

founJ

thclr

tht:>rl:.'

WdS

dtl

arr-.rngemcllt.

nu cont.

rd ct

!n:t1...rvL'ri

ltll'

parties limiti:-ig the Respondent to 1-eccivin1: olllv $20.r)(I per
month for payrn•cnt of the _iud;::ment and denied t_he i1pnclL1r.c'c
injunction.

The Appellant appeals from that ruling.
STATEt1Et;T OF FACTS

In 1974 James !lauss and his wife,

Engleharde l:auss were

owners and operators of the business known as Jir.1' s Surplus and
Storage located in Tooele, Utah.

During the operat1un of this

business, the llauss' s borrowed money from >iilliam Gochis in
order to further the business operation.
On October 12, 1974 the llauss's,

jointly and severally,

borrowed $9,800.00 from William Cochis.

This transaction is

evidenced by the Installment Promissory !Jute executed by James
Mauss and Engleharde llauss.

See Exhibit 1.

The Installment

Promissory Note bore no interest and was tu bl' paid, i:: fd l. '"
November 12, 1974.

The note was not paid, nor anv portion of

paid, on or before !Jovemher 12, 1974.
As a result of the Appellants'

deia1ilt.

"

lciwsu1:

w"''

instituted; and on May 1::, 1975 the Court entered,, Jud;mtr'
against the Appellants in favor ot

-2-

th.- kespr>ndcnt.

Tht· 'l r

i ,,;

ir

1 <Jlfft awarded the Respondent the sum of $9 ,400 .00, plus
118.13 in attorney's fees,

:•
I ,

Ii

l

and $22.00 in court costs.

See

hit 2.
After the Judgment and during the next five (5) years, the

Appellants made no payments on the Judgment, and the Respondent
made no attempts to collect or execute on the Judgment.

In late

1979 the Respondent made numerous contacts with the

attorney in an attempt to get the Appellant to start paying
"something" on the Judgment.
In January of 1980, as a result of working through the
Appellants' attorney, the Respondent started receiving $20.00
per month as payment on the Judgment.

The Appellant's attorney,

also, told the Respondent that at some point the monthly
payments would be increased, and the Judgment would be
satisfied.

The monthly payments have never been increased, and

the Judgment remains unsatisfied.
At the time Appellant started making the $20.00 per month
payments, which was January of 1983, the Judgment, plus the
accrued interest at the legal rate, was approximately

$14,569.39.

Interest was accruing at the legal rate of six

pecrCET.t ( 6%) per annum or $69 .00 per month.
The Respondent never agreed, in writing or orally, to only
S20.00 per month as payment on the Judgment.

The

'<c"'fHindent never agreed, in writing or orally, to forgo or waive
,,,,

uf Lis legc1l remedies to collect on the Judgment and neither

ciid he, imply the same at any time.

-3-

Three (3)

yedrs later,

v.nen it iic:Ldrrrc: ·lf'I'·"' lit

Appellant was not going tu satistv the·
intended to make

fJL'c

:;;2(),(l(l

Respondent sought tu r

1

rl)i...'t'l·d

rnunth

T11J»111,·:H

vli th

LIH

L'lll

.11Jrl

1 !11

p1·nn1·11l1; ''"

L"·'

ll·,·t Illf1

L

•'11!,,

l·rri"'"'' 111
111,

through a Sheriff's Sdie.

Respondent was limited to onlv receiving 32Cr.01J Per munth dS
on the JGdgment.
Motion To Enjoin Sheriff's Sale on the basis tha'.

nu such

contract ever existed between the parties.
ARGUtlE!lT
POINT I
THE RESPOIWENT DID !JOT COtlTRACT WITH THE APPELLP.t:T
TO ACCEPT OJ:LY $20 .00 PEP. 1;or;rn Ir; P..;r':Tr:,-0-;--fff[11 , 540. 33 JUDGHEtlT AWARDED TO THE Rf:SR5T'.I'Effr:--

s

The Respondent adamantly denies the existence oi any
contract with the Appellant to accept only $20.00 per month on
Judgment exceeding $11 ,000 .00.

The Respondent oenies there w.is

any offer, acceptance or consideration in order to consurnate

;i

valid contract.

Judgment with the intl·rH tu

a

"nd the: Rt-s 1»ndl'11'.

.

'

contrn.ct

\,'lttl

contacts

;.,"i tli /,p!-JL l l,::.1:t

to

pay

11

,,T)t11.:l

lllL'

SOJT1C:ti11n2'

t,::11

11

or.

1

:__,

thf

._, '..::

:_'Jr!:L''

.Ju\J,.!1.,cnt

-4-

!.- ., • . ._

j'

I l

• '1\·l

r·

f,

d

AJ>f'L'LLrnt's attorney and the Respondent resulted in an ad hoc
1111.l,,rsLan<ling that the Appellant would begin making $20.00 per
,,, 11
,I

1

pdvments; and that, at some point in time, the Appellant
1

n· n·nse that monthly payment.

The fact that Respondent

'"- 1·1veJ these $20.00 per month payments is not an "acceptance"
v. i r h the intent to cc ntract as required by law to form a
1

rrc:ct.

l'lr.

was elated to receive "any" type of

f'dYlllent from the Appellant after he had received no payments for
Almost five (5) vears.
Even assuming that the Court finds that there has been an
offer and an acceptance in the traditional sense of contract
law, the alleged contract between the parties is not valid
because it is not supported by the essential element of valuable
consideration.

The classical definition of consideration is as

follows:
"A valuable consideration in the sense of the law,
may consist either in some right, profit, or benefit
accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment,
loss or responsibility, given suffered or undertaken by
the other." (Contract Law by Charles Knapp.)
In the case at bar, the debt owed to Respondent was reduced
to Judgment in May of 1975.
·" that time was $11 ,540.33.
d

The amount owed to the Respondent
The Judgment became, and is today,

pre-existing obligation owed to the Respondent.
cnunsel originally argued and represented to

: ''" l ri,a c,ourt

1·111111

U1dt

"in trns case the consideration is that the

l'laintifi U<espondent)".
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See Paragraph 4 of Page 4

of Defendant's (Appellant),
Enjoin Sheriff's Sale.

tle111ura11d1m i11 S111•1»rl

N uv;,

t) l' tu rt· l

Appellant's counsel is argul!l)', th,1t

Jl

l'

,,·.,

1i l 'l' l

J

1

Lr

[(>;

1 1 1 1 11

l

tl1e· «<>t1'I>i• '·" 1"11

alleged contract shuulJ be thl' c1,1ct 1 '"'' ,,1

1·1

and/or that the Appellant hds rc:llvd

UIK>J,

the parties to her legal detr11•1cnl.

:;c'l' i'.'i'c'

,J

:.nc

'·"'."

1u1d«t·,1,111•JJ11•
'""

Appellant's Hrief.
lt is a well established principal
estoppel mav be apolicJ,
substitute for consideration.

::11"t

t

ne c1c1cLrinv

in c1•rL1in c.rs1·s,

llc

:1.<c

Appellant's counsel cites

Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369 (l'JbO), as a
case illustrating this principal.

Although

similarity to the facts of the present case,

this case has

soc1c

it has nu::'11ng tc1

do with the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
Judge Durham detennined that the principal of accord an,:
satisfaction ruled the outcome of the case not promissory
estoppel.

In Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, !1r. Anderson

had incurred a different legal detriment as a result of
satisfying the debt he owed to Sugarhouse

lir.

had borrowed the money elsewhere to satisfy the debt,
detrimentally relying on the Vl!"ties'

tnerc' 1 y

agrec"l<:'r.C:.

"ln effect, defendant had agree,'i to transt"r the
debt represented bv pLn nt1ff' s
LL· ,, t 11ir
party, thereby i'TI'l\eciiate>l·J
n",JJ
owed tu
'I• i . _ 1.·.
had no legctl 0Ll1gdllu11 t .. '''·" t"
could on 1 \' T":O\'(' [,'\' 1 t ·
already o;.;,ned by thl' dctcnd<Jnt
l' 11"'1f•
•,J
legally rE::'quirl' cJefE·nd :n• tr !'!
l' 1
gations co satisfy the j
h·:
l: ; :: ·

-6-

Ar1ut.:rSL 1 ;1

POINT II
THE CONTRACT, IF ANY, BET\ffEN TJIE l'Al'Tl/C; JS
BARRED BY THE ST/\TllTE OF
The Utah Code Annotute<!, Sec'.tiun

IY'd,

,,,

'"">I'

states as follows:
f'llt
'-;]) 111
1-,,, \'r>i(J
"In the fol lo\"'inr:
C\' ·:v
unless such agreement, or srnne n,itc ,1r memi..)r,-1ndum
thereof, is in
subscribed
tlw i«lrlv Lu be
1

ct1drgeJ

L11ert>\..l t:i

" ( 1)
Every agreement by its tc·nns is nut to be
performed within one year from the rn0king thereof."

The Appellant argues t11at tne dlieut;ed cuntrc1ct is
memorialized in the legal sense in the letter which tlr.

Barrie

Vernon sent to the Respondent on February 8, 1980, thereby
satisfying the Statute of Frauds.
It is obvious that a $20.00 per month payment on a Judgment
in excess of $11,000.00 will not satisfy the same within one (1)
year.

Therefore, a writing or an acceptable memorandum of that

agreement must be in writing.
Mr. Vernon's letter of February 8, 1980 does not set forth
or memorialize the terms or conditions of any contract.

The

only thing Mr. Vernon does do is to represent that the Appellant
will be making $20.00 per month payments but, also,

immediately

begins to dispute the amount due pursuant tu the 1974 Promissory
Note.

That issue was detern1i!led by the Trial Court in thl'

<lrir,i11.:-il

r:...-:1sP

v11j1'!1

}1

s1:.s,0.;;,
The let tPr is,

,J,....,'-..t1rv

!ti

'

a1

sr_1,

r

'

nnt

by it, namely the Appellant nor tlie kesfx>!ldent.

-8-

s L rung

ly

uq',l'

Lhe Court that a letter sent to a person by another's attorney
,11fiµuting the amount owed, which, by the way, had already been
, , ,Jii,·cd

to judgment, and rehearsing events which allegedly

.,. ,·11rreJ sC>vcral years prior, that this "writing" does not meet
Lhte ciiLeria ui Sectiur1 131, Restatement (Second) on Contracts
\ 1981) •
i

urtt1t>nnure, c:l1<c cuntt>nts

U1e letter show no legal

Oi:

detriment to the Appellant as and for consideration to bind such
an arrangement.
Appellant cites Guinand v. Walton, 22 Utah 2d 196, 450 P.2d

467 (1969), in support of the memorandum theory.

The letter in

that case was signed by the persons who were incurring a legal
detriment.

They were exchanging business assets to secure the

employment from another person.

The Appellant in the present

case suffered no legal detriment.
Appellant argues that the alleged oral contract was
partially performed and therefore it should be taken out of the
Statute of Frauds and made totally enforceable.

Appellant cites

Price vs. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 P.2d 767 (1906) and Jensen v.
Whitesides, 13 Utah 2d 193, 370 P.2d 765 (1963) in support of
th2t acglil!lent.

A careful reading of both of these cases

indicated that the agrieved party in each case had fully
rhei

fH'rfnr:'l0rl
ll1L·ttvl,

11,

t11e

cf

r

ur<..1.i..

Fr ·1·rlc..

nf thP

nr;i]

ap,reement;

;rnrl

as a result

v..ias e11£urced notwithstanding the

I suggest to the Court that the proposition

r 11.it cuntruls "hen partial perfunned oral agreements should be

-9-

taken out of the Statute of Frauds is as folluws
contract is not performable within one (1)
writing according to the applicable St<-Jtute

enforceable.

ur aJ

dll

Y<'ar and should lw in

,,f l·r:n1d.,

oral agreement is fullv fJCrfo_rmed c;n nnc c:id1•
weight of authority the Court mciy make the

h11< n

I

h··

i><·I)

(JL1l

C(J!lt

ra

The rationale being that this avuiJs li1L'

:.i1'1
L

1

ii<

111

<"I

lllJ

uc:'.

which would result if the par:y whc' haJ n•n·1ve<i the· ''ttlc:-,
performance could use the Statute of Frauds to escdpe his ow11
obligation.

Dutton v.

Interstate

·

]Q

Cal.2d 65, 199 P.2d 138 (1941).
Therefore, partial performance of an oral contract not
performable within one (1) year can only make enforceable that
portion of the oral contract which has been performed.
It is obvious that the Appellant, by paying $20.00 per
month, would not pay off a Judgment of $11 ,540.33,

plus the

accruing interest at the legal rate, within one (1) year; and
therefore, any agreement of this nature should have been in
writing.

Assuming that the Court finds an oral agreement

existed, then only that portion of the agreement which has been
performed is enforceable,
POINT III
THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL IS !WT
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
Promissory estoppel is an equitable

:•1.·

imposed to prevent fraud, serious i nJ ur:: c '.- :;L"·''
injustice.

Appellant cites .c.'._l_itsos

-1 0-

:-i

'.i'

, I K l'. id 1 L9 ( 1966) as a case evolving the doctrine of

rr<>1111ss0ry estoppel.
H'h<d

hetween the parties whereby the plaintiff did not

l<>se
Ll•l'

In that case, an agreement had been

on the mechanic's lien which he held in reliance upon

dl'lencJanL's promise to pay the $681.46 debt.

The defendant

11evc:r paid the debt and the six (6) month statute time limit
expired in which to foreclose on the lien.
denied any liability on the debt.

The oefendant then

The Court helci that the

ckfendant was estopped from denying the liability and may be
sued in a personal action regardless of the fact that the time
for foreclosing on the lien had expired.
The Court determined that Kadish's forbearance of not
foreclosing on the lien may not have had "consideration" in the
traditional sense, "but he certainly forebore in reliance upon
Appellants promise to pay".

Glitsos v. Kadish, p. 132.

Furthermore, Kadish would have been substantially injured as a
result of that forbearance if the Court allowed Glitsos to deny
his liability.
The Appellant has not, in these proceedings, forborne or
suffered any legal or equitable injury to the rights or
she may have, or had, as a result of paying $20.00 per
mnnth on the Judgment.

Nor has she suffered any injustice as a

of the Respondent patiently accepting only $20.00 per
.•1unth as payment on a Judgment of $11,540.33, plus interest at
tlie

le,;al rc1tc, uver a three (3) year period of time.

-11-

The legal

interest alone on the Judgment and compounded 111tt·rest,

1s

currently accruing at $125.00 per month.
The Court would be creating
Responde<t if it

$20.00

iJ

manifcsl 1111w;! 1c·<·

the Appellant tu cu11t111u,·

l<>r

indi'

ll1<

th,·

month payments on the Judgment
cor;cLUSION

ln SUllll•iJry,

ll

is tne kespondent's position that 111 the

absence .Jf any offer, acceptance or cunsiderat ion that there is
no valid contract between him and the Appellant.

Any payment

the Appellant has made to Respondent should not be deemed to be
"consideration" for the creation of any new contract because the
Appellant is only paying on a pre-existing duty which was
created when a Judgment was rendered against the Appellant in

llay of 1975.
The alleged contract was, and is, non-performable within
one (1) year and is required to be in writing according to
Section 25-5-4, Utah Code Annotated.
have the oral agreement,

In order for Appellant to

if any, taken out of the Statute of

Frauds, she must allege and pruve that she has fully perfonned
her part of the agreement, which Appellant has not done.
Partial perfonn;rnce is not sufficient to take the entire
contract out of the Statute of Frauds.
The Annellant has suffered no legal detriment at all as a
rL0u.1..t

o:

tJic

:_11dt

has bef'n cxtreml!ly

tnc

patient 1n accept1np her small munthlv payments prior tu
If

-1 2-

tt1e Court did c;l low thP ad

\1,q' 1n1d.,rstanding to continue, the Judgment and the accruing

,,,r,

tt'Sl

1

11il

would never be paid and the Appellant would be making
>'"r P1onLh payment in perpetuity.

Jhc,retore,

the Respondent prays that the Court uphold the

,J,,,,1s1on of the Trial Court in favor of the Respondent by
rcmdnding the matter to the 1hird District Court in and for
'Ju,Jt:le County, and thereby allowing the Respondent the right to
on his Judgment.
submitted this 8th day of July, 1983.

D
• WHITE
Attorn
for Plaintiff-Respondent
Prudential Plaza
185 North Main Street, Suite B-1
Tooele, Utah 84074
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
'" r

,.J,y certify that two (2)

copies of this Brief were

11·d to Barrie A. Vernon, Attorney for Defendant-

South tlain Street, Tooele, Utah, on this 8th day
1 Ii\'.

1 '<R

J.

__LJ

14:--3 f::
"-->0
WHITE
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent

DOL.G
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v._ ) ,

S
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EXH 1 Bl T 1
ALLMENT PROMISSORY NOTl

Tooele City.

colly

P'Om•tO lo ray 10 the ord•r of

1

,,

xx

.. Utah or al hich o•h•r pl•(• •• .... ltellllef h..-...

,,,., 0

,,, 011 ..,,,., 1 !i ,., 0 , po·d '" full ... ,thin 10 doy1 olt•r th du• dr:il•. o chorgo 111oy b• 011e1Hd of S

NA

.......• Or ol hollll.,'1 •l•rl••"· 0111 •••••I

P•"•nloQ• 101• 1lol•d obowo l1111e1 lhe vripoid omourll of Iha uuloll"'ertl l101t1 th• d.,e dole ol th1 •fltlolhnent 41111111 poilf f111 fwll.

,,,,•old•< dH"'' lhell ''"•tufO 01 ol default b. mode lt1 poymonl In ... hole or '" porl of OflY lrulaOnieftl al the
', •,

..

.
Hundred
mor Nine
Thousand Eight
DOll•RS 119,800.00
1·.iiJ in full tlovember 12, 1974

"''

,, .....

. 19 74

WILLIAM COCHIS
Tooele

(''

. ui.,October 12
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